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PENAL INCARCERATION AND CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
WILLIAM S. McANINCH*
The principles of humanity and human dignity to which we
subscribe, as well as the purposes of rehabilitation require that
the offenders, while under the jurisdiction of the law enforce-
ment and correctional agencies, be accorded the generally ac-
cepted standards of decent living and decent human relations.
Their food, clothing and shelter should not be allowed to
fall below the generally accepted standards, and they should be
afforded the conventional conveniences made possible by our
technological progress. Their health needs-both physical and
mental-should be met in accordance with the best medical
standards. Recreation should be recognized as a wholesome ele-
ment of normal life.'
Adhence to the foregoing century-old statement of principle
of the American Correctional Association and to its amplification
in the Manual of Correctional Standards2 would have precluded
the filing of a substantial portion of the cases hereinafter consid-
ered. However, lest these cases suggest that the foregoing princi-
ples have been absolutely ignored, it should be noted that it is
generally only the abhorrent situation that is afforded judicial
cognizance. The courts simply have not had occasion to consider
conditions in many, if not most, prisons. On the other hand this
should not imply that conditions in most prisons do not warrant
judicial scrutiny. It may well be that inmates in those prisons
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina
This research was conducted under a grant to the South Carolina Department of Correc-
tions from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice (*NI-70-048).
This article reflects portions of THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED co-authored by
Professor McAninch pursuant to the terms of the research grant. The conclusions drawn
and the positions taken in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the South
Carolina Department of Corrections or the United States Department of Justice.
1. Principle XVI, Declaration of Principles of the American Correctional Association;
American Prison Association, 1870; Revised and Reaffirmed at the Sixteenth Annual
Congress of the American Prison Association, Louisville, Kentucky, 1930; Revised and
Reaffirmed at the Ninetieth Annual Congress of the American Correctional Association,
Denver, Colorado, 1960.
2. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS (3d ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as Manual].
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have lacked the resources to bring their complaints into the judi-
cial arena.
At any rate the inmate seems fortunate not to have to rely
exclusively on the warden's implementation of "principles of
humanity and human dignity". He is occasionally aided by judi-
cial implementation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment, which punishment has been
found in segregation, corporal punishment and sometimes in in-
carceration itself.
I. PUNITIVE ISOLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
While many correctional institutions purport to distinquish
punitive isolation from administrative segregation, with the for-
mer implying a determinate period of punishment and the latter
an indeterminate custodial classification and security device, the
courts do not always make the distinction, especially when the
treatment accorded inmates in both situations is essentially the
same. One court, granting the inmates' request for preliminary
injunctions against their incarceration in administrative segrega-
tion for long periods of time, characterized the difference as
"largely one of semantics." 4 The court noted that the inmates
were treated the same as those inmates in punitive isolation but
without the safeguard of prior disciplinary procedure-a prere-
quisite of incarceration in punitive isolation.5 On the other hand,
essentially similar treatment of those in the two different catego-
ries has been upheld where dictated by the fact that there was
but a single physical facility for the incarceration of both.,
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has refused to accept the institution's characterization of the one
as "segregation" and the other as "punishment" when both en-
tailed substantial deprivation of institutional privileges such as
the earning of money, three meals per day, access to the mass
media, library, educational facilities, and daily baths. The court
reached this conclusion in spite of acknowledging that the rela-
tive deprivation may be even more harsh in what the institution
3. See generally Manual at 413.
4. Smoak v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
5. See generally Chapter 12, "Disciplinary Procedures," W. McANiNCH & E. WED-
LOCK, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED (1972).
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labeled as "solitary confinement" than in "segregation". 7 That
court had previously glossed over the distinction between the two
when noting, that the particular petitioner then before the court
had " . . . from time to time [been] placed in punitive confine-
ment or maximum security on such charges as incitement of
riots." 8 Two years later however, the court characterized maxi-
mum security in that correctional facility as " . . . more restric-
tive than imprisonment of the prison population at large but not
nearly so harsh and confining as that of prisoners in 'solitary'."'
On finding that an inmate was not in punitive isolation but
in administrative segregation due to his classification as an es-
cape risk, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently affirmed a district court's dismissal of his petition for
release from "solitary" where he had been allegedly placed at the
whim of prison officials. 0
Unless otherwise indicated segregation shall refer to what is
commonly known as administrative segregation; punitive
isolation shall refer to what is known as "punitive segregation,"
"solitary confinement," and the like.
Without regard to the conditions of confinement a threshold
issue in segregation and punitive isolation cases often involves the
underlying constitutionality of the decision to so confine. Much
has been written elsewhere about requisite procedural due pro-
cess." Of more immediate concern, however, is whether segrega-
tion or isolation is disproportionate to the disciplinary infraction
thereby punished.
The Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
test of disproportionality of punishment to offense must be distin-
guished from the proscription of that which is cruel and unusual
because it is shocking to the conscience (a separate issue to be
discussed later). Punishment is disproportionate to the offense
when its severity outweighs the offense's seriousness. This deter-
mination is of course a relative one and is made against a
background of a traditionally acceptable range of punishments
for offenses. In condemning a sentence as cruel and unusual from
7. Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966).
8. Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 906 (4th Cir. 1966).
9. Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968).
10. Krist v. Smith, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
11. See generally Chapter 8, "Disciplinary Methods," W. McANINCH & E. WED-
LOcK,THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED (1972).
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this perspective the United States Supreme Court once noted
that the sentence ". . . exhibits a difference between unres-
trained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of
constitutional limitations formed to establish Justice. 1 2
As in other areas of corrections law, the "hands off" doctrine
has been-and is-a typical judicial response to complaints of
improper incarceration as to be arbitrary or capricious.' 3 Consid-
erable weight is generally accorded the prison officials' determi-
nation that administrative segregation is,required by the particu-
lar inmate's potential for disrupting the institution.'4
Even extended terms of up to eight years in administrative
segregation have been judicially approved for a particularly vio-
lent offender.'" The correctional official should, however, be pre-
pared to establish the underlying reasons for the decision by
pointing to the nature of the crimes for which the inmate was
originally convicted as well as specific acts of violence or escape
attempts while in the institution.'6 As noted by a federal district
court in the recent, important case of Landman v. Royster:
Reasons of security may justify confinement, but that is not to
say that such needs may be determined arbitrarily. . . . "Se-
curity" or "rehabilitation" are not shibboleths to justify any
treatment."
Segregation of an inmate of renown to preclude the "rubber-
necking" by other inmates with its attendant confusion would be
a denial of equal protection.'8 When inmates were held in "soli-
tary confinement"" for five weeks without charge or hearings and
where the duration of such incarceration threatened to extend
indefinitely, one court granted a preliminary injunction against
their being so confined. 2 The court noted, however, that segrega-
12. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
13. E.g., Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967), [Two years in admin-
istrative segregation]; Morgan v. Cook, 236 So. 2d 749 (Miss. 1970), [Indefinite incarcera-
tion in maximum security].
14. E.g., Young v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Peyton, 294 F.
Supp. 173 (E.D. Va. 1968).
15. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967). See also Royal v. Clark, 447 F.2d
501 (5th Cir. 1971).
16. E.g., People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Ct. App. 1968).
17. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971).
18. Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
19. This court rejected the distinction between administrative segregation and puni-
tive isolation. See generally notes 4 through 12 supra.
20. Smoak v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
[Vol. 25
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tion would be appropriate " . . .when there is evidence of a
substantial nature to justify the belief that a threat to orderly
prison operation exists."
'2'
Extended terms of segregation pending investigation of al-
leged incidents which might warrant disciplinary proceedings
and while awaiting trial for in-prison offenses have been ap-
proved.21 Segregation has been approved for one refusing to work
23
and until one agreed to cut his hair.24 Solitary has been approved
inter alia for prison breach25 and for violation of anti-"writ-
writer" regulations. 26 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Sostre v. McGinnis2 reversed the lower court's
determination that indefinite terms of segregation were dispro-
portionate to a combination of serious infractions including fail-
ure to answer questions, possession of contraband, and violation
of anti-"writ-writer" regulations. The court expressed no view as
to the constitutionality of indefinite segregation for one or for a
combination of less than all of these infractions.
2
On the other hand, lengthy terms in segregation for failure
to sign a "safety sheet, ' 29 for "racial preaching,"3 and for refusal
to divulge names of others interested in particular religious serv-
ices 3' have been held improper. It should be noted that conduct
in the last two examples is protected by the First Amendment's
exercise of religion clause and under the circumstances of those
cases would not warrant any disciplinary action.
32
A court has recently held that solitary confinement for
"defective delinquents" in a treatment center cannot exceed fif-
teen days in even the most extreme case. 33
21. Id. at 612.
22. E.g., Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a/i'd, 435 F.2d 1255
(3d Cir. 1970).
23. Falles v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
24. Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
25. Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3rd Cir. 1967).
26. Novak v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
27. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978
(1972).
28. Id. at 194.
29. Signing of the "safety sheet" was required to insure that the inmates read the
safety rules. Here the inmate refused to sign as he believed it would waive his claim for
damages for personal injury. Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972).
30. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
31. Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966).
32. See note 87 infra.
33. McCray v. State, 10 CRI. L. Rm. 2132 (Cir. Ct., Mont. Cty., Md., Nov. 11, 1971).
1973]
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Ii. CONDITIONS DEEMED CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
Although the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment was originally intended to preclude resurrec-
tion of such bygone practices as disemboweling and drawing and
quartering, its contemporary utility emanates from a 1910 Su-
preme Court case which noted that it ". . . is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane Justice."34 Even though a particular
practice or treatment may have been acceptable at one time in
the past, evolving standards of human decency may now preclude
its application: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 5
There are generally three tests for determining whether par-
ticular punishment is cruel and unusual: (1) whether it is dispro-
portionate to the offense (discussed above); (2) whether it is of
such character as to shock the general conscience; and (3)
whether, although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim,
it goes beyond that which is necessary to achieve that aim.
As will be developed, several common threads seem to bind
together those cases in which the courts have found incarceration
under particular conditions to be cruel and unusual punishment.
One of the most striking examples is Jordan v. Fitzharris.36 There
the strip cell was solid concrete six feet by nine feet, almost to-
tally dark, and completely devoid of furnishings save an "Orien-
tal" hole-in-the-floor type toilet which could not be flushed by the
inmate, and which was sometimes flushed only twice a day by
staff. During the inmate's eleven-day period of incarceration
there the cell was not cleaned; it was covered with not only his
vomit and other bodily wastes but also that of its previous occu-
pants. The inmate was afforded no opportunity to clean his
hands, teeth, or the rest of his body, and had to handle his food
under these conditions. The cell was not heated and at night the
only relief from the cold concrete floor was a stiff canvas mat not
long enough to stretch out on and incapable of doubling over to
serve also as a blanket. The inmate was kept absolutely naked for
the first eight days of his confinement. Despite his repeated re-
34. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
35. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958).
36. 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
[Vol. 25
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quests for medical assistance, medical aid for the entire 108 in-
mates of the facility during his incarceration consisted of one
eight-minute and one ten-minute visit to the facility by the medi-
cal officer. It is doubtful that the institution's case was furthered
by the in-court suggestion of its consulting psychiatrist that the
inmate could have cleaned himself by using part of his daily
ration of two cups of water, 3 or by his response to the judge's
query as to whether the inmates were permitted or forced to eat
under those conditions:
I don't know as they were forced to. It is true that if they were
going to eat, that they might have to eat under those -circum-
stances.
Another court found cruel and unusual punishment in the
incarceration of two inmates for two and a half days in a six foot
by ten foot cell under the following conditions: there were no
windows and no artificial light; the two blankets provided had to
be used to absorb the overflow from the malfunctioning toilet;
and there were no hygienic implements, no soap, towels, toilet
paper, or toilet articles."
More serious overcrowding resulted in Holt P9 and Holt 11,4o
where an average of four inmates were housed in eight foot by ten
foot isolation cells. Such overcrowding was among the reasons
cited in a finding of cruel and unusual punishment. Other factors
mentioned included the infestation by rats, general filth and lack
of sanitation, including the indiscriminate reissuing of mattresses
among the inmates incarcerated there-one of whom died of
infectious hepatitis. While the segregation cells were singled out
by the court as examples of cruel and unusual punishment, incar-
ceration in any part of the institution in question was deemed
cruel and unusual punishment, for the institution as a whole
failed to meet contemporary standards of humane treatment.
A similar result obtained in Jones v. Wittenberg,4' where
incarceration in any part of the county jail was held to violate the
Eighth Amendment. As in Holt the segregation cells were ac-
37. Id. at 678.
38. Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969); aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3rd
Cir. 1970).
39. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
40. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
41. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
19731 585
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corded special mention. While the dimensions of the two cells
were not given, the court implied that they were essentially one-
man cells but noted that they had contained as many as sixteen
or seventeen inmates at a time.2 The cells were totally unfur-
nished and had no sanitary facilities, not even a drain. Although
the cells were beneath ground level and unheated, the inmates,
including females, were stripped while incarcerated there.
In Wright v. McMann43 prominent reasons for a finding of
unconstitutionality of conditions in segregation cells included
enforced nudity in cold cells and sleeping on cold concrete floors.
As there was some conflict of testimony as to the temperature of
the cells the court suggested the periodic recording of tempera-
tures in the future. The court noted that "unquestionably the
stripping of the cell and the nudity of Wright was for discipline
alone.. .""and commented that there was nothing in the record
to indicate that these measures were required to preclude the
inmate's injuring himself. This observation is perhaps related to
that of the court in Jordan v. Fitzharris, discussed earlier, that
although some inmates were allegedly placed in segregation to
prevent their committing suicide, some were nonetheless success-
ful.
While the prison administrator might conclude from the fore-
going that he cannot win either way, both cases simply point up
the necessity of his documenting and supporting his position. If
certain harsh measures are necessitated by particular circum-
stances, he must be prepared to establish not only those trigger-
ing circumstances but also that the harsh measures are justified
by their effectiveness.
The court in Landman v. Royster observed that it would
authorize the detention of an inmate without clothing,
...only when a doctor states in writing that the inmate's
health will not thereby be affected and that the inmate presents
a substantial risk of injuring himself if given garments.45
The court in Wright v. McMann6 also noted that hygienic
42. Id. at 97. For another condemnation of crowding, see Landman v. Royster, 333
F. Supp. 621, 649 (E.D. Va. 1969).
43. 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) aff'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972). See also
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
44. Id. at 138.
45. 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971).
46. 321 F. Supp. 127, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 25
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implements such as soap and toilet paper were not readily acces-
sible but would be provided only when an officer happened to be
available at the time of a request for them. Although the cells
were not cleaned prior to an inmate's incarceration, he was appar-
ently provided with a rag and some soap for this purpose. The
cells certainly surpassed those of previously discussed cases in
overall sanitation, but their being "not too clean" seems to have
been a factor in the court's finding of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
Hancock v. Avery 7 found cruel and unusual punishment in
incarceration in a five foot by eight foot concrete cell that lacked
adequate light and ventilation, had an "Oriental" toilet flushed
five times every twenty-four hours, and which lacked any higienic
materials such as soap, towel and toilet paper. The court noted
that the inmates had to handle and eat their food". . . without
any provision for cleanliness or even minimal sanitary conditi-
tions."'8
Finally, in a case dealing with juveniles a court concluded:
... [A] two-week confinement of a fourteen-year old girl in a
stripped room in night clothes with no recreational facilities or
even reading matter must be held to violate the Constitution's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. .... 1
No findings of lack of heat or sanitation were necessary for this
conclusion. The court's preliminary injunction called for, inter
alia, bed and chair, reading material, and other recreation such
as exercise and fresh air.
As recently noted in Sostre v. McGinnis" courts have often
held that segregated confinement in solitary or maximum secu-
rity is not per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.5 ' While most courts reach this conclusion
with little discussion, Sostre did consider in some detail the psy-
47. 301 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 289.
49. Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473, 482
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also McCray v. State, 10 Cat. L. Rpm. 2132 (Cir. Ct., Mont. Cty.,
Md., Nov. 11, 1971).
50. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978
(1972).
51. E.g., Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Courtney v. Bishop, 409
F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Ford v. Board of Managers,
407 F.2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1969).
1973]
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chological effects of long-term isolation, acknowledging the relev-
ance of such inquiry to the Eighth Amendment issue. 2 The court
concluded on the facts before it that the plaintiff's segregation,
while severe, was not barbarous or shocking to the conscience.
However, this court's inquiry into the psychological effects of
segregation may well indicate a developing trend in the judicial
resolution of redefining that which is cruel and unusual in terms
of a "progressing sense of humanity."53
It could readily be concluded from the cases previously dis-
cussed that incarceration under unsanitary conditions, with
immoderate temperatures and while nude would be uniformly
deemed cruel and unusual punishment." One exception to this
was a holding in 1966 that incarceration for 27 hours while nude
in forty-degree temperature did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription 5 This result was reached by favorably com-
paring the conditions in question with those judicially approved
in two earlier cases, one involving a deprivation of food, water and
toilet paper for fifty-two hours56 and the other involving condi-
tions of flooding which required additional surgery on one so con-
fined while weak from a prior operation.-' It is submitted that
today's judicial response to the facts of any of these three cases
would be one of condemnation." Often, of course, allegations of
conditions of barbarous treatment fail for lack of proof.59
The cases where severe conditions in segregation are not
"cruel and unusual punishment" generally share a few common
threads. Even though the cells may be dark"0 and lacking in furni-
ture save a mattress at night,6" they have been reasonably clean
52. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma.
Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
53. Id. at 191.
54. See generally Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), wherein the court found
conditions in segregation not cruel and unusual after emphasizing that the key criteria
for this determination is the degree of sanitation. That court had previously condemned
treatment which included the forced consumption of laxatives by a large group of persons
then crowded into small cells. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
56. Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962).
57. Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
58. E.g., Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Knuckles v. Prasse,
302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3rd Cir. 1970).
59. E.g., Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Village of Nixa ex rel.
Hedgpath v. McMullin, 198 Mo. App. 1, 193 S.W. 596 (1917).
60. Novak v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
61. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
[Vol. 25
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and without noticeably unsanitary conditions. Although clothing
may not fit properly,6 2 it is available. More recently allegations
of conditions as cruel and unusual (which may have one time
been dismissed as frivilous) are now warranting serious considera-
tion. The court in Sostre, while not finding cruel and unusual
punishment, did characterize as "severe"6 3, incarceration under
the following conditions: a six by eight foot cell that had a toilet,
facebowl with running water, soap and towel, weekly shave and
shower, opportunity for one hour's daily exercise with other in-
mates, and access to selected books from the library. Evolving
standards of human decency constantly redefine that which the
Eighth Amendment precludes.
Complaints of inadequate diets in segregation traditionally
have not had a sympathetic reception in the courts. Of the few
cases that have determined meals and their attendant conditions
to be unconstitutional, one case, not surprisingly, stressed lack of
sanitation in preparation and serving of the food. 4 It should be
recalled that having to eat under unsanitary conditions has often
accompanied a finding of cruel and unusual punishment.65
While a diet of one meal per day plus two slices of bread was
one of the items contributing to a finding of unconstitutionality
in Hancock v. Avery, 66 ordinarily the courts seem to approve al-
most any diet in question. Courts have approved thirty days of
bread and water, 7 bread and water for two days with two meals
every third day, 8 bread and water plus one meal every third day,69
thirty days of a "limited diet,"7 no water for twelve hours," and
a restricted diet of 2000 calories daily. 2 An inadequate diet plus
62. Burge v. State, 90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451 (1966).
63. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nor.
Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). But see Tyree v. Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554 (D.
Mass. 1971), which in denying a preliminary injunction noted that conditions similar t'o
those in Sostre plus access to a radio indicated no possibility of success on the Eighth
Amendment issue.
64. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971); Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
65. E.g., Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
66. 301 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
67. Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3rd Cir. 1967).
68. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
69. Novak v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Ford v. Board of Managers,
407 F.2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1969).
70. Belk v. Mitchell, 294 F. Supp. 800 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
71. Burge v. State, 90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451 (1966).
72. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
1973]
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loss of weight has been held not to amount to cruel and unusual
punishment,13 and a denial of an ulcer diet to one in segregation
who had previously been on such a diet was held not actionable
where there were no allegations of serious bodily injury.74 It is
difficult to understand these bread and water diet cases which
generally seem to be a throwback to an earlier time.7 1 One court
characterized as "slow starvation" incarceration with a diet often
lacking in nutritional elements and which rarely reached the min-
imum level of 2000 calories per day and sometimes was as low as
1400.0 It should be noted that this was the diet for all the inmates
of the institution, a county jail, and was not limited to those in
segregation. The conditions deemed "severe" in Sostre included
a diet providing 2800 to 3300 calories per day. This may be an
indication that courts may become more concerned with allega-
tions of inadequate diet. Indeed, another federal court readily
determined a bread and water diet to be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, having found it to be" . . . inconsistent with cur-
rent minimum standards of respect for human dignity."77
III. OTHER ASPECTS OF SEGREGATION
Visitation, exercise, rehabilitative opportunities and access
to reading material are considered together. Rarely has the denial
of any one of these to the inmate in segregation been of special
judicial concern; of course the cumulative effect of their individ-
ual denial could be of more import.
Courts have typically approved-often without com-
ment-the denial of access to the media to those in segregation.
This is not, of course, to say that such denial, especially to a long-
term segregatee, is good prison practice; and in more recent cases
regardless of the ultimate resolution of the cruel and unusual
punishment issue courts have noted that at least limited reading
material78 and other access to media79 is being allowed by the
73. Heft v. Parker, 258 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
74. Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964).
75. Perhaps the recent case of Herrell v. Mancusi, - F. Supp. - (N.D.N.Y.
1971), represents a new approach. In that case the court issued a preliminary injunction
against the institution's providing a three day bread and water diet.
76. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
77. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971).
78. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v.
Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
79. Tyree v. Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass. 1971).
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correctional officials. In a case involving a juvenile segregatee the
court has specifically ordered that reading material be supplied."
The same case also ordered that provisions for exercise of the
juvenile be established.
The lack of exercise of one in segregation received considera-
ble attention in Krist v. Smith."1 Although the lower court did not
conclusively resolve this aspect of the Eighth Amendment issue
because the prison was then in the process of implementing a
system that would allow exercise for those in segregation, it did
note that the continued denial of exercise may well render pun-
ishment "cruel."82 Considering the complaint of a long time resi-
dent of death row, another federal district court recently held that
Confinement for long periods of time without the opportunity
for regular outdoor exercise does, as a matter of law, constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 3
The court in Sostre approved the requirement of forcing the
inmate to submit to a complete strip search on entering the exer-
cise yard in order to preclude the secreting of weapons on the
person. Such a practice, if required out of a legitimate concern
for security and not undertaken for harassment, would probably
be upheld.
The denial of access to rehabilitative services for one in segre-
gation, while perhaps counterproductive to the overall purposes
of incarceration if continued over a long period of time, has not
heretofore been deemed of constitutional dimension.' Indeed, the
lack of rehabilitative services for one in the general prison popula-
tion has only recently been noted by the courts. In Holt v. Sarver
the court, while reluctant to conclude that rehabilitative services
were constitutionally required, stated:
The absence of an affirmative program of training and rehabili-
tation may have constitutional significance where in the ab-
80. Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, 332 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
81. 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
82. Id. at 501.
83. Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (E.D. La. 1971). See also Taylor
v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
84. E.g., Tyree v. Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass. 1971); Clegget v. Pate, 229
F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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sence of such a program conditions and practices exist which
actually militate against reform and rehabilitation. 5
It would not be too difficult to conclude that often the conditions
in long-term segregation do actually militate against reform and
rehabilitation. It is certainly conceivable that courts may start to
probe this area. The lack of rehabilitative services was one factor
contributing to the conclusion in Jones v. Wittenberg, that simple
incarceration in the institution in question was a violation of the
Eighth Amendment."
As in exercise of religion cases concerning inmates in the
general prison population, courts in segregation cases distinguish
between religious belief and religious exercise, with unlimited
freedom of the former but with limitations on the latter. 7 Courts
have almost unanimously upheld the institution's denial to those
in segregation of attendance at regular services for the general
prison population. However, the vast majority of these cases have
noted that the segregatee was allowed to be visited by a minister
or chaplain. 8
One court did uphold the denial of both attendance at gen-
eral services and of access to chaplain when confinement in segre-
gation was limited to thirty days.89 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has upheld, against equal protec-
tion challenges, the practice of one institution of allowing those
segregatees with relatively good conduct records to attend serv-
ices while denying attendance to those evidencing a proclivity for
85. 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
86. 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
87. However as the exercise of religion is one of the "preferred freedoms" of the First
Amendment any restriction thereon must be justified by a compelling state interest. Of
course in prison cases, the interest most often asserted is that of "security" but this
incantation is no shibboleth. The burden of establishing the necessity for the restriction
on free exercise is most definitely on the prison administrator. See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton,
437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971). Once this burden has been met, developing prison law
indicates that he must then meet the least restrictive alternative test of establishing that
there are no available alternatives that would serve the needs of security in a manner less
restrictive on the exercise of religion. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir.
1969). Additionally the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that institutional treatment accorded one individual or group be essentially similar to that
accorded others similarily situated. See, e.g., Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969).
See generally Chapter 3, "Exercise of Religion," W. McANINCH & E. WEDLOCK, THE
EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED (1972).
88. E.g., Graham v. Willingham, 265 F. Supp. 763 (D. Kan. 1967), aff'd, 384 F.2d
367 (10th Cir. 1967).
89. Belk v. Mitchell, 294 F. Supp. 800 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
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misconduct. 90 Although one court recently found no constitu-
tional deprivation in the denial "for several days" of a Bible to
one in segregation,9' the requirement of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the segregatee's holy book
should be made available92 seems more in line with developing
constitutional law in this area.
Under the doctrine of "least restrictive alternatives, ' 93 it
would seem that a segregatee's potential for disrupting a general
service could preclude his attendance there, but would not justify
total deprivation of his free exercise of religion. Allowing him
access to religious books, publications and ministers would serve
the institutional need for security while being less restrictive of
his fundamental rights. Cases involving the exercise of religion in
segregation have been considered by the courts as First Amend-
ment issues rather than as an aspect of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, although it would seem that the denial of all religious
activity to a segregatee desirous of it might be one factor in the
determination of the Eighth Amendment issue.
IV. AccEss TO THE COURTS
Access to the courts by the incarcerated has been treated
extensively elsewhere94 and the basic principles indicated there
are applicable regardless of the inmate's custody status. The due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guaran-
tee him access to the judicial process. The case of Johnson v.
Avery," while dealing primarily with anti-"writ writer" regula-
tions, has served to remind the judiciary that this right merits the
highest priority in judicial protection. As noted by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, "...
[T]he Constitution protects with special solicitude a prisoner's
access to the courts. 97
90. Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969).
91. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 141 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
92. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
93. See Barnet v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
94. See generally Companion article "Access to Courts and Counsel", infra p.
95. Access by state prisoners to federal courts was recognized in Ex parte Hull, 312
U.S. 546 (1941); access by state prisoners to state courts was recognized in White v. Ragen,
324 U.S. 760 (1945).
96. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
97. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom.
Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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Earlier cases upholding limitations on the right of access to
the courts by those in segregation should be reconsidered in light
of Johnson v. Avery. Denying segregatees access to legal materials
though formerly upheld,98 may now be deemed unconstitutional.
In concluding that the conditions of segregation in Sostre were
not unconstitutional, the court pointed out the availability "of
unlimited numbers of law books"." One in segregation has the
same right of access to attorneys and courts as one in the general
prison population. Indeed, both recent federal circuit court of
appeals cases providing for inmate access to the American Civil
Liberties Union (and through it to the courts) involved inmates
in segregation."" Segregatees may be denied access to inmate
"writ writers," but only if other adequate means of access to the
courts are provided. In a post-Johnson v. Avery case, In re
Harrell,'"' the California Supreme Court concluded that a "writ
writer" could be precluded from interviewing inmates in isola-
tion. In reaching this conclusion the court assumed that clerical
assistance would be provided to inmates in isolation, that the
normal maximum term of such confinement was 30 days, and
that "next friend" applications could be submitted on behalf of
one in isolation, even though not signed by the one in isolation.
V. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Corporal punishment as an institutionalized means of disci-
pline is clearly proscribed by the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. " . . .[I]t is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture . . .and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden . .1.2 This proscription in-
cludes not only those devices such as the "Tucker telephone," (a
device for sending a strong but non-lethal electrical charge
through an inmate's body, 103) which would probably be recog-
nized as an implement of torture by any society at any time, but
98. E.g., In re Allison, 66 Cal. 2d 282, 425 P.2d 193, 57 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1967).
99. Sostre v, McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 194 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma.
Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
100. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548
(1st Cir. 1970).
101. 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914
(1970).
102. Wilkinson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
103. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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may also include practices which were formerly acceptable. Thus
the use of the whip or strap was finally condemned as unconstitu-
tional in Jackson v. Bishop,0 4 as was the use of tear gas against
an inmate who poses no present physical threat. 05
Of course, not every application of force would be deemed
cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense. A single punch by
a guard thrown in a scuffle with an inmatel"6 and the use of
reasonable force to move an inmate who refused to move volun-
tarily' 7 has been upheld. On the other hand some treatment, even
though only indirectly effected by prison staff, may be considered
cruel and unusual. Thus the rampant incidents of homosexual
rape in barracks which staff could not, or would not, control were
prominently mentioned in the finding that simply being incarcer-
ated in the Arkansas prison system constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.'"
Yet corporal punishment is hardly an academic or theoretical
matter.' 9 The aftermath of the infamous Attica uprising indi-
cates that the infliction of even severe and brutal corporal punish-
ment is not a thing of the past. Indeed, instead of being an iso-
lated act by an individual guard, such treatment apparently be-
came institutionalized. Confronted with evidence of rampant
brutality by correctional personnel,"10 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that injunctive relief
should be granted against further physical abuse. That court
noted that the federal district court had been unwarranted in
assuming that adequate steps would be taken to protect the in-
mates against further reprisals and directed the district court to
104. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
105. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 649 (E.D. Va. 1971).
106. Foster v. Jacob, 297 F. Supp. 299 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
107. Konisberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 161 (8th
Cir. 1969).
108. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971). But see Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1972), wherein several sexual
assaults of an inmate were not deemed cruel and unusual.
109. E.g., Tolbert v. Bragan, 451 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1971).
110. The plaintiffs in the case had presented "detailed evidence" that:
[i]njured prisoners, some on stretchers, were struck, prodded or beaten with
sticks, belts, bats or other weapons. Others were forced to strip and run naked
through gauntlets of guards armed with clubs which they used to strike the
bodies of the inmates as they passed. Some were dragged on the ground, some
marked with an "X" on their backs, some spat upon or burned with matches
and others poked in the genitals or arms with sticks.
Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1971).
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consider the appointment of federal marshals to the institution
to insure the implemention of its injunction against such brutal-
ity in the future."'
Corporal punishment is clearly cruel and unusual. In addi-
tion to enjoining its application, courts may also impose personal
civil liability on both those who inflict it and the superiors respon-
sible for such behavior."'
VI. OVERALL FACILITIES DEEMED CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
While the physical facilities of a corrections system may be
a cause of dismay to the correctional officials, inmates, and pub-
lic alike, this dismay has seldom been deemed of Constitutional
dimension. That a facility may be very old, too large, unattrac-
tive, and not particularly well suited to present purposes is not
of Constitutional concern. There are, of course, some conditions
dictated in whole or in part by the physical plant that may lead
a court toward the conclusion that confinement therein is cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
As in the segregation cases these conditions for the present seem
limited to gross overcrowding and lack of sanitation.
Recently a prisoner complained that his transfer from one
institution to another within the same correctional system de-
prived him of his former cell, which was
a larger, more modern, single occupancy cell with tile walls,
outside windows with view of the recreation yard and an ample
expanse of sky, a large bed with springs, an upright locker as
well as a footlocker for clothes and personal property, a desk and
chair, and a solid door to reduce outside noise.""
Substituted therefor, in the facility to which he was transferred,
111. Id.
112. Liability may sound in tort for an injury received by an inmate as the result of
the breach of a duty owed to him by the administrator; no disposition of state property is
sought, nor is the suit against the administrator in his official capacity, thus solving the
problem of sovereign immunity. Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga.
1966); Bartlett v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1967); Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C.
279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940); Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1, 159 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1967).
Personal liability may also be imposed under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 if the basis of
the action is deprivation of federal rights under the color of state law. See Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405
U.S. 978 (1972).
113, United States ex rel. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 1079 (D. N.J. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d
126 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1055 (1970).
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was a cell that was all metal and concrete and from which the
view through three sets of bars revealed only a blank wall and the
roof of an adjoining structure. One's initial reaction might range
from incredulity that an inmate would seriously expect a room
with a "view" to genuine sympathy for the plight of one whose
view of the sky, and perhaps inspiration, had been taken away.
At any rate, the court, while expressing sympathy for these and
other complaints, could find no denial of Constitutional rights.
On the other hand, facilities which do not meet minimum
standards of sanitation will spawn judicial relief. While the great
bulk of these cases is directly concerned with conditions in segre-
gation,"' their principles (which give substance to the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment)
would be equally applicable to the correctional facility as a whole.
Indeed some conditions acceptable in segregation may, if applied
to the general inmate population, be found constitutionally lack-
ing. Some conditions in segregation are tolerated because of the
temporary nature of segregation, because segregation is imposed
as additional punishment only after the due process safeguards
of the disciplinary hearing, or because segregation is necessary to
protect the inmate from himself or others."5 These rationales
would seem of limited applicability to the entire facility.
In Holt v. Sarver"' the entire Arkansas prison system was
held to violate the Eighth Amendment's ban-an inmate's sim-
ply being incarcerated there subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment. The system had little to recommend it. The court
based its conclusion on the combined effects of the "trusty" guard
system, barracks sleeping arrangements, overcrowded and unsan-
itary isolation cells, lack of rehabilitative programs, inadequate
medical and dental facilities, an unsanitary kitchen, and
inadequate clothing for inmates who work out-of-doors in incle-
ment weather. One could not pick out a particular item as being
per se determinative of the Eighth Amendment issue. Indeed, as
the court noted, in an otherwise unexceptional penal institution,
the lack of rehabilitative programs would not be of constitutional
dimension; it is only in a situation where other circumstances
114. Id. at 1080.
115. But compare dissent of Cravens, J., in Breedon v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578 (4th
Cir. 1972). Judge Cravens suggests that an inmate should not have to relinquish his
privileges in order to secure bodily protection.
116. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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combine to militate against rehabilitation that an affirmative
program may be constitutionally required."7
Similarly, a barracks or dormitory sleeping arrangement,
while perhaps not desirable, would not ordinarily be deemed un-
constitutional provided that reasonable precautions are taken to
protect the inmates so confined. But when there is no segregation
by classification, when security is expected to be provided only
by inmate guards or floorwalkers, when homosexual rape and
dangerous assaults are known to be rampant, housing in such a
dormitory would be cruel and unusual.
One condition that by itself can lead to judicial intervention
is a lack of sanitation. As noted above, lack of sanitation and
facilities for basic hygiene was the most salient feature of vir-
tually every case condemning a segregation cell. Not surprisingly,
the isolation cells in Holt were among those so condemned. Lack
of sanitation was also prominently featured in Jones v.
Wittenberg,"' in which incarceration in a particular county jail
was held to be cruel and unusual. There an overcrowded, late
nineteenth century structure featured toilets with leaking soil and
waste pipes (inmates who, because of overcrowding, had to sleep
on the floors onto which the waste material leaked); solitary con-
finement cells without drains or sanitary facilities of any kind; a
kitchen into which sewage leaked and which lacked equipment to
sanitize the dishes after they had been washed by hand; and cells
and bull-pens which lacked ventilation and illumination save
that available through broken windows. Although perhaps not
directly related to limitations inherent in the physical facility, it
should be noted that the jail also lacked facilities and personnel
for social services, exercise, recreation, reading, and rehabilita-
tion. Facilities for meeting both attorneys and regular visitors
were extremely limited and afforded no privacy.
As the court noted, the institution housed both those await-
ing trial and those already convicted and serving sentences. As
to the latter the court concluded: "If the constitutional provision
against cruel and unusual punishment has any meaning, the evi-
dence in this case shows that it has been violated."" 9 But as to
those awaiting trial and not yet convicted, the court noted that
even if the above detailed treatment were not deemed "cruel and
117. Id. at 370.
118. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
119. Id. at 99.
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unusual," it would still be proscribed. On the one hand it is
"punishment" applied without due process of law20 and on the
other it represents a denial of equal protection vis-a-vis others
awaiting trial who are not incarcerated. Those in pretrial deten-
tion" . . . are not to be subjected to any hardship except those
(sic) absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only
"121
In fashioning relief the court was of course restricted by the
limitations inherent in the existing physical plant. 22 Yet these
limitations were largely obviated by the court's ordering a reduc-
tion in prison population so that no cell would be occupied by
more than two persons at a time. 23 The court also ordered that
the preparation and serving of food meet minimal standards of
hygiene for commercial establishments, that conditions of light-
ing and sanitation in segregation cells, as well as in the prison as
a whole, meet minimal standards of the housing code, and that
at least two guards be present on each floor at all times. Addition-
ally the court required improved medical services, much more
open communication including uncensored correspondence, in-
creased visitation, and access to publications. In the area of reha-
bilitation the court required establishment of work or study re-
lease programs, basic and remedial education programs, and pro-
grams of group and individual counseling. The court retained
jurisdiction to insure that its orders were carried out.
A similar result was obtained in Hamilton v. Love 24 in which
the court declared incarceration in another county jail to be un-
constitutional. The overcrowded structure, built in the 1920's,
housed primarily those awaiting trial. The plaintiff's complaint
alleged, inter alia, inadequte bathing and toilet facilities; lack of
120. For another finding of a violation of due process of law in the subjection of those
awaiting trial to conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment, see Brennan v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
121. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See also Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
122. Relief was granted following an additional hearing. Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
123. The court anticipated that this order could be affected at least in part by admit-
ting to bail many of those awaiting trial in the jail. In a remarkedly candid opinion the
court acknowledged the existence of the practice of holding a person accused of crime
without bail in order to induce a plea of guilty. Id. at 715.
124. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). See also Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp.
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ventilation; no recreational areas or programs; overcrowded, un-
sanitary, and insecure cells with a lack of protection against un-
provoked assaults and homosexual attacks; no classification and
rational separation of inmates; and the presence of rats, roaches
and poisonous insects. The defendants indeed stipulated that the
conditions violated minimal federal constitutional requirements
with respect to due process and cruel and unusual punishment.,25
Such determinations have not been limited to the federal
courts. In the recent case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex
rel Bryant v. Hendrick'26 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
upheld a lower state court's finding of cruel and unusual punish-
ment in confinement in a particular county jail. The court based
its conclusion on the increasingly familiar combination of over-
crowded, damp and unsanitary cells, sexual assaults, and insuffi-
cient institutional protection. Additionally, the court noted beat-
ings of the inmates by the guards.
It seems reasonably clear that the progeny of Holt v. Sarver,
discussed earlier, will be an increasingly frequent judicial deter-
mination that simple incarceration in a given facility is violative
of the Eighth Amendment, especially where that facility can be
fairly characterized as unsanitary and overcrowded, with a con-
comitant incidence of homosexual attack, and lacking facilities
for providing basic amenities. The administrator may well find
his institution being measured by standards from which it hereto-
fore seemed exempt. The facility may be judged by the
requirements of housing codes and sanitation codes, for example,
to determine the acceptability of situations of overcrowding and
uncleanliness.
Indeed, in the recent case of Ely v. Velde'27 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit may have indicated a new
trend in the judicial response to the problem of the construction
of a state prison with Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion funds when LEAA had failed to take into account the re-
quirements of the National Environmental Policy Act'2 and the
National Historical Preservation Act.' 9 These acts preclude the
spending of federal funds without consideration of the proposed
125. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
126. 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
127. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
129. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
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project's impact on the environment and on settings of historical
interest. Popularly referred to as the "environmental impact
case", Ely v. Velde indicates the importance of perspectives tra-
ditionally deemed irrelevant to the determination of the appro-
priateness of a correctional facility.
While the prison administrator may be tempted to excuse
subpar performance by maintaining that his limited resources
preclude his doing more, this response is receiving a decreasingly
sympathetic ear in the courts."" In the landmark case of Holt v.
Sarver discussed above the district court emphasized the inade-
quacy of this response.
Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the
Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not
depend on what the Legislature may do, or upon what the Gov-
ernor may do, or indeed, upon what Respondents may actually
be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a Peniten-
tiary system, it is going to have to be a system that is counte-
nanced by the Constitution of the United States.1 3'
Any doubt as to that court's solution to the problem was
dispelled in the more recent case of Hamilton v. Love.
Inadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for
the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights. This
Court . ..can and must require the release of persons held
under conditions which violate their constitutional rights, at
least where the correction of such conditions is not brought
about within a reasonable time.'
32
As summarized by then Judge Blackmun, "Humane consid-
erations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to
be measured or limited by dollar considerations.'1
3"
130. In Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971), the court noted that the
minimizing of state expenses could not of itself justify infringement on First Amendment
Rights.
131. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
132. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971) quoted with approval in
Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 422 (N.D. Tex. 1972). See also Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971), and Rozecki v. Goughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972),
in which the court noted that good faith use of existing resources would not be an adequate
defense to an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate heating.
133. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968).
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Where other facilities were available within the prison sys-
tem one court has responded by ordering the transfer to such
facilities of the inmates presently incarcerated under conditions
found to be "cruel and unusual".'34 Of course it is not always the
physical facility itself which dictates the conclusion that confine-
ment therein is cruel and unusual punishment. As noted in a
concurring opinion in Holt v. Sarver at the appellate level, new
buildings and additional guards do not necessarily solve the prob-
lem of inhumane treatment of inmates.'35 In such a situation,
especially if previous court orders have been of no avail, a court
might place the institution under receivership, thereby literally
taking over the supervision of its daily operation. 3
That a particular physical facility can in fact pass constitu-
tional muster should not, of course, end the inquiry. The particu-
lar brand of penology that obtains in a given facility may well be
as much a function of the physical facility as of the desire of staff.
A warehouse for people that provides no space for an inmate to
have recreation, to work off frustration, anger, or simple energy
may go a long way toward undermining other efforts at rehabilita-
tion. A newly designed institution providing for four-man cells is
building-in a denial of protection, dignity and privacy for which
no amount of vocational education can compensate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amendment proscrip-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment suggests a pattern to the
emerging rights of the confined. The length of detention in segre-
gation, whether punitive or administrative, must bear a reasona-
ble relation to the purpose of such detention. Inordinately long
periods of such incarceration may be deemed cruel and unusual.
Unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, extremes of temperature,
and grossly inadequate diets are often among those factors that
support judicial determinations of Eighth Amendment viola-
tions. Additionally, courts are beginning to indicate concern over
lack of opportunity for physical exercise, lack of opportunity for
134. Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
135. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 310 (8th Cir. 1971) [concurring opinion].
136. Such a drastic result has not as yet obtained. However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently authorized the appointment of federal
monitors to a state prison to insure compliance with the federal district court's orders.
Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1971).
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exercise of religion, and the effect of isolations from human con-
tact. As a general rule, courts will not approve of conditions in
segregation which are more rigorous than demonstrably necessary
for prison security and segregatees must be afforded ready access
to courts and counsel.
Clearly falling within the proscription of the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban of cruel and unusual punishment is institutionalized
brutality and consequently courts will not condone any form of
corporal punishment.
Although rarely do the conditions of prison facilities present
issues which rise to constitutional dimension, simple incarcera-
tion in a given facility may be deemed cruel and unusual punish-
ment if the conditions of incarceration, taken as a whole, are
shocking to the conscience of contemporary humanity. Ordinarily
a combination of severe overcrowding, a lack of sanitation and a
lack of adequate protection from assaults by other inmates or
guards will lead to this conclusion. Inadequate funding of an
institution has been specifically rejected by the courts as a justifi-
cation for the proscribed conditions. Should a given facility be
deemed unconstitutional, the court may order its closing and the
transfer or release of its inmates.
While some fundamental legal doctrines affecting correc-
tional institutions have changed, much of the specific law has yet
to be developed particularly in a given jurisdiction. The recalci-
trant correctional administrator can of course midwife its devel-
opment by continuing to condone conditions and practices that
basic decency and fair play would condemn. On the other hand,
by eschewing nice calculations of that which is minimally accept-
able, he can help provide new and workable standards which the
courts might in turn emulate. Instead of resisting change the
administrator can seek ways to implement it in mutually accept-
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